Free Will

Rather ambitiously (perhaps), we decided to sort out the problem of free will. It seemed the sort of thing that could be resolved over a couple of pints, particularly on a Wednesday night.

So far, and this is subject to change, I think we came down on the side of (and I'm inventing a new term for this as far as I can tell) reluctant determinism i.e. we don't have free will but think we do (or want to think we do). 

Here are some notes from the discussion:

Maybe the Diceman (which I haven't read!) is a beautiful summary of the 'free will problem' - to achieve freedom, you're gonna have to forego freedom ... Resonates with Sartre's 'authentic life' etc. 

Interestingly, just because I cannot foresee the choices I make, does not necessarily mean those choices are free. 

If the microscopic fluctuations that lead to macroscopic laws are truly random, why do they consistently aggregate to produce those same macroscopic laws, insofar as they manifest as laws? Are there underlying microscopic laws that govern the consistent location of the average stochastic outcome? Might these microscopic laws relate to the physical constraints of the particles that vibrate to produce them?

Might humans experience free will in the same way as a particle of radiation? In other words, at the individual level it is impossible to determine the result of an outcome or choice point, but when aggregated to include numerous examples, statistical determinism emerges.

Choice exists at an abstract level, beyond the matter that makes it manifest, so is not dependent on the physical laws that govern such matter.

On reflection, a more accurate label for this position is 'reluctant illusionism'. 

Nevertheless, even this illusory free will is not infinite in scope, more like a restricted illusory will, with an even further restricted freedom of action.